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21st Century Javelin Catchers: White 
House Organization and the Chief of 
Staff 
Molly Schwall 
History and Government 
Introduction 
residents need help. The cyclical nature of the presidency means every four years, a 
president starts with a completely blank slate by which he can impose a new culture 
on the White House.1 However, he cannot accomplish this task by himself. When 
presidents enter the White House, there are certain discretionary services that are needed 
by every chief executive, regardless of the coloration they take. How they obtain this help is 
up to the president's individual strengths and weaknesses, but there are three main areas 
in which White House staff serve the president (Buchanan, 1990). First, staffers help in 
pushing the president's agenda. In efforts to direct the presidential policy agenda, the 
president will rely on others to construct policy proposals, draft legislation, devise political 
strategy, interact with the media, vet political appointees, and influence Congress, among 
other duties. Second, the president relies on others to cope with the unexpected. Crises are 
inherent to the presidency, and often, presidents must make decisions that have long-term 
significance under time constraints and with imperfect information. In these situations, 
presidents often rely heavily on personal advisors as well as technical experts to justify the 
decision he is making. Finally, the president relies on others to transition into his position. 
Presidential scholar Bruce Buchanan (1990) writes, "In this sense, each new president is a 
founder. The White House Office is surely the most flexible organization in the executive 
branch of government." The president must rely on his staffers to fill the gaps that he 
cannot as one person. These needs vary based on the individual strengths and weaknesses 
of the president as an individual, but generally include accommodating personal quirks and 
providing moral and emotional support. A president's organizational system must 
accommodate the diversity of talent required to supply the necessary help.  
At the helm of White House organization is the office of chief of staff (COS). The office of 
                                                             
1 Presidential scholar Bruce Buchanan explains, "The traditions of the office mean that each new president 
literally starts over, tabula rasa, imposing new procedures, new assumptions, and a new atmosphere, or 
culture. In this sense, each new president is a founder. The White House Office is surely the most flexible 
organization in the executive branch of government. Because of his personal role in achieving his station, his 
considerable constitutional power, together with the ongoing importance of his personal presence to success 
in office, each incumbent continues to exert a dominant, and highly idiosyncratic impact on how the work of 
the White House is done" (1990).  
 
P 
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White House COS, pioneered by Sherman Adams, has been a permanent fixture in White 
House organization since 1953. Since its inception, the position has undergone 
considerable growth and evolution into the relatively stable institution that it is today. At 
the same time, each COS has considerable flux about his role in relation to the president 
whom he serves. A COS is the overseer and coordinator of the president's staff and is often 
described as primarily responsible for the success or failure of an organization whose 
purpose is to extend the power and reach of the presidency (Cohen, 2005). Clearly, the 
power inherent in this position is obvious. As manager of the decision-making system that 
is the presidency, the COS is in the best position to know what is happening across the 
entire executive branch, if not the entire government as a whole, more than any other 
individual.  
This paper examines the major models of White House organization and its impact on the 
ability of the COS to perform his major roles. I seek to explain the way that White House 
organization evolved to meet the needs of the institutional presidency and focus on the 
individuals who served at the head of the White House organizational structure as COS. The 
office of COS is clearly a linchpin of the institutional presidency, but the individuals who 
inhabit it differ considerably in their talents, interests, backgrounds, and limitations to 
their work. This delicate balance requires a "structured agency" approach, situating the 
office of COS within "existing structures of organizational combat, institutions, and policy" 
(Jacobs and King, 2012).   
Literature Review  
Every president since Richard Nixon has relied on a chief of staff. The office of COS is 
burdened with the job of managing "the whole institution of the White House" by serving 
as a "systems manager: boss of none but overseer of everything" (Patterson, 2001). There 
is widespread scholarly consensus on the need for a chief of staff to manage the massive 
organizational operation in the modern White House. Given the time demands placed on 
the president, as well as increasing responsibilities placed on the White House post-New 
Deal, World War II, and Cold War, a COS is indispensable to the functioning of the White 
House (Pfiffner, 1996; Walcott, Warshaw, and Wayne, 2001; Cohen, 2002).  
Role of COS  
Cohen and Hult (2012) argue that the COS is critical to the overall success of the 
administration. The apparent need for a COS has led many scholars to study the roles of the 
position in an attempt to better understand the type of COS best suited to a presidency 
(Neustadt, 1987; Hess 1988; Buchanan, 1990; Ellis, 1994; Hart, 1995; Pfiffner, 1996; Burke, 
2000; Sullivan, 2004). Cohen (2002) defines four main roles of COS: administrator, advisor, 
guardian, and proxy. These four roles are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive but tend to 
encompass the main responsibilities of the position (Cohen, Hult, and Walcott, 2016).  
Administrator. The most basic responsibility of the COS is to act as an administrator or 
coordinator of the White House (Kernell and Popkin, 1986; Buchanan, 1990; Pfiffner, 1993; 
Cohen 1997; Walcott, Warshaw, and Wayne, 2001; Cohen, 2002). They are responsible for 
coordinating the entire White House and are often blamed if things go awry (Cohen and 
Hult, 2012). Coordination is defined by Kernell and Popkin (1986) as: "providing the 
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president with information, relaying messages to those in the line agencies, maintaining the 
president's calendar, giving him technical advice when he solicits it, and generally 
performing whatever duties a manager could reasonably ask of a factotum." The size of the 
White House demands that someone must oversee the organizational process—failure to 
do so will be disastrous. Chiefs of staff must ensure that the policy process is functioning 
well, ensure that the president is not overwhelmed with paper flow, regulate access to the 
Oval Office, and manage the president's time (Kernell and Popkin, 1986; Buchanan, 1990; 
Pfiffner, 1993; Cohen 1997; Cohen and Krause, 2000; Walcott, Warshaw, and Wayne, 2001; 
Cohen, 2002). A COS who fails as an administrator will often lead to avoidable mistakes 
that reflect poorly on the president himself. However, a COS who is an expert administrator 
produces a well-running White House that "holds people accountable and speaks with one 
voice" for which the president can take public credit (Sullivan, 2004).  
Advisor. The COS also serves as a policy and political advisor to the president (Buchanan, 
1990; Cohen, 1997; Kemell and Popkin, 1986; Pfiffner, 1993; Walcott, Warshaw, and 
Wayne, 2001). While most chiefs of staff insist that they are neutral policy brokers (Kernell 
and Popkin, 1986), the COS has strong influence as an intimate advisor to the president in a 
tightly knit inner circle of senior staff. Even when chiefs of staff are intentionally not 
advocating for a position, their judgements about policy and politics will be influential 
(Cohen, Hult, and Walcott, 2016). The exact importance of the COS as an advisor is highly 
dependent on the relationship that he has with the president; all chiefs of staff are not 
created equal. Further, a COS who has experience and policy acumin will almost certainly 
be a trusted advisor by the nature of his knowledge (Cohen and Hult, 2012). However, a 
COS who abuses his advisor position by shutting out opposing viewpoints will find himself 
without many friends in Washington.  
Guardian. The next role of COS (and the role that makes the COS unique to the modern 
presidency) is that of guardian. While a variety of White House staffers can provide 
management of processes and political advising to the president, the COS alone must act as 
guardian or protector of the president. This role often includes distasteful tasks, such as 
disciplining and firing administration personnel, saying no to political elites seeking favors, 
acting as a lightning rod for criticism of the administration, and mediating disputes within 
the White House and among Cabinet members (Buchanan, 1990; Ellis, 1994; Kernell and 
Popkin, 1986; Patterson, 2000; Pfiffner, 1993; Walcott, Warshaw, and Wayne, 2001; Cohen, 
2002). The COS must protect the president, even at their own expense.  
Proxy. The final role for the COS is that of proxy. COS often acts as a stand-in for the 
president in a range of activities, including meeting with members of Congress, speaking 
before constituency groups, or pushing the president's agenda on the media circuit (i.e., 
Sunday news shows). Since the Reagan administration, most chiefs of staff spend 
considerable time working alongside Congress on major legislative and policy matters, 
particularly budget negotiations (Walcott, Warshaw, and Wayne, 2003). While many 
members of Congress often prefer communicating directly with the president, they usually 
accept the COS as a messenger to convey official administration policy preferences. The 
extent of any chief's proxy involvement may reflect a president's lack of interest in 
engaging in these actions, strategic presidential time delegation, or a growing demand for 
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presidential presence (Cohen, Hult, and Walcott, 2012). This involvement also takes into 
consideration the individual chief's skill, time, and relationship to the president. A COS is 
more likely to be viewed as a proxy if they are perceived to be close in relationship to the 
president and can accurately speak for the administration's policies.  
White House Organization  
There are three major models of White House organization (Johnson, 1974; Campbell, 
1986; Hess, 1976; Buchanan 1990).2 Research suggests that chiefs of staff, in addition to 
presidents, help to shape the organizational structure of the White House (Cohen 2000; 
Kernell and Popkin 1986). Both individuals sit at the top of the White House hierarchy and 
both steward the influence and power needed to change the organizational structure. Each 
management style is associated with costs and benefits that inevitably surface when a 
particular organizational structure is used. In practice, it is rare to find strict adherence to 
one management model. Many presidents use different models in different policy areas. 
These models closely coincide with Porter's (1980) classification of presidential 
advisement patterns, which are less concerned with the establishment of a certain 
organizational model and more interested in patterns of policymaking within the larger 
executive branch. 
Formalistic Model. The formalistic model features a clear-cut division of labor and 
hierarchy of power, with particular duties ascribed to specialists (Buchanan, 1990; Walcott 
and Hult, 2005). The formalistic model can be found in presidential administrations such as 
Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and G.W. Bush and feature a significant 
delegation of presidential authority to specialized staffers, including the chief of staff.3 The 
formalistic model has several advantages. First, the model's emphasis on division of labor 
to specialized staffs tend to yield more thorough and a higher quality policy analysis than 
other models. The formalistic model is closely associated with the centralized management 
advisory style that requires White House staff to filter ideas and impose the imprint of 
presidential goals on all actions undertaken in the president's name (Porter, 1980). Second, 
the formalistic model allows the president greater flexibility in how he allocates his time 
and energy. Other models, which provide much freer access to the president, gain those 
benefits at a significant cost: the loss of presidential control over time and schedule. 
Potential disadvantages of the formalistic model include a tendency toward slow and 
cumbersome operations. Further, many scholars point to a lack of presidential 
accountability in the formalistic model because its tendency toward greater presidential 
isolation and delegation increases the amount of actions taken by others in the president's 
name, increasing the likelihood that some of those actions will be beyond the scope of the 
president's constitutional powers.    
Competitive Model. The competitive model is marked by a deliberately open and informal 
                                                             
2 See Figure 1: Performance consequences of management styles. Source: Pika, 1988.  
3 The prevalence of Republican presidents using the formalistic model highlights the phenomenon of 
"partisan learning," defined as the "tendency to transmit organizational philosophy along party lines" (Hult 
and Walcott, 2004). Until the appointment of Hamilton Jordan as COS in the Carter administration, no 
Democratic president had a formal COS, opting instead for the collegial method of White House organization 
(discussed below).  
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division of labor that leads to competition among staff members through overlapping 
jurisdictions and organizational ambiguity. Also referred to as adhocracy, this model relies 
on the unsystematic use of individuals and non-routine channels to advise the president 
(Porter, 1980). The competitive model is highly diverse and thrives on outside input, both 
politically and technically. While only one president—Franklin D. Roosevelt—has ever 
used this model in the White House, there appears to be a resurgence of this style of 
management at the beginning of Donald Trump's administration in a White House marked 
by multiple factions of the Republican party (Pfiffner, 2017). This model benefits the 
presidency by fostering a creative tension that helps to produce new and innovative ideas. 
While the ideas are creative, the policies they produce are often less developed due to the 
emphasis on political feasibility over the best answer (Pika, 1988). Another benefit stems 
from the ambiguity of the organizational structure of the competitive method, in which the 
only source of resolution for the conflict that the competitive method naturally instigates is 
the president himself. This keeps the president involved and in control of the entire 
operation of his White House. The fatal flaw of the competitive method, however, is the fact 
that it places unattainable demands on a single individual (Pika, 1988). Few presidents 
have the accessibility and emotional stability required to be the broker of conflict that this 
model encourages.  
Collegial Model. The collegial model, in which multiple advisors are directly accessible to 
the president in "spokes of a wheel" fashion, was used by John F. Kennedy, Gerald Ford, and 
Jimmy Carter. Those who employ the collegial model aim to obtain the benefits of the 
formalistic and competitive model while avoiding the worst drawbacks. Using this model, 
presidents avoid a strong COS while maintaining an open-door policy to a number of 
advisors who specialize in different areas. The multiple advocacy advisement pattern is 
most closely correlated with the collegial model, an open system of decision-making based 
on the inclusion of competing views presented by advocates whose positions are 
coordinated by an honest broker—normally the COS (Porter, 1980). The collegial model 
allows for greater team-based problem-solving, and when functioning at its peak potential, 
it may represent the optimal response to the unpredictable nature of the American 
presidency (Buchanan, 1990). However, when the collegial model is not operating at peak 
functionality, the model runs risk of groupthink, when pressures for conformity cloud the 
decision-making process (Pika, 1988).4 Even with its many benefits, many scholars caution 
against the collegial system because it places a substantial demand on the president's time 
and attention (Pika, 1988). Additionally, maintaining an environment in which individuals 
are free to work as a team requires intense interpersonal skills that few truly possess. 
Historical Development  
The advent of the modern COS roughly coincides with the dawn of the modern presidency.5 
Prior to Franklin Roosevelt, each president operated with only one paid, formal staffer. 
This arrangement continued until Congress empowered Roosevelt to add multiple 
                                                             
4 Irving Janis (1982) coined the term "groupthink" by analyzing the effects of small-group solidarity in 
situations where stakes are high, pressure is great, and secrecy is important. The danger in these instances is 
that the group will develop the illusion of invulnerability, underestimate the enemy and chances of failure, 
and fail to reexamine their initial assumptions.  
5 See Figure 2: Chiefs of Staff, Nixon-Trump, 1968-2018  
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"administrative assistants" in the late 1930s, increasing staff size to about 50 (Hult and 
Walcott, 1995). A staff of this size was informally managed by Roosevelt and preceding 
presidents. Beginning in World War II, the size of White House staff exploded with the 
incorporation of some bureaucratic agencies into the executive branch (most notably, the 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconstruction). Dwight Eisenhower appointed the first 
COS at the advent of his administration. Eisenhower was accustomed to a formal COS in his 
former military position, so he appointed Sherman Adams to fill the job in his presidential 
administration. However, the initial innovation of the role did not immediately stick. 
Democrats immediately branded the role of COS as too formal and militaristic (Johnson, 
1974). Democratic presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson did not use a COS, 
opting instead for a collegial model of White House organization that encouraged staffers to 
report directly to the president (Walcott and Hult, 2004).  
Many scholars point to the Nixon administration as the first modern White House staff 
organization. Nixon built upon his experience as Eisenhower's vice-president to institute a 
system in which his COS (H.R. Haldeman) acted as a strong systems manager in the style of 
Sherman Adams, oversaw all White House operations, and reported directly to Nixon. Even 
still, the pattern of White House organization tended to reflect what scholars refer to as 
"partisan learning" (Hult and Walcott, 2004). The method that Republicans used to 
organize their White House was "wrong" to Democrats, and Democrats often took extremes 
to prevent the appearance of any form of staff hierarchy in their organization. President 
Jimmy Carter was the last president to attempt to govern without a formal COS, but toward 
the end of his first term, he caved to the mounting disorganization and appointed Hamilton 
Jordan as his COS. For the most part, this settled the scholarly debate about the need for a 
COS in the modern White House. It had simply grown too large and complex for the 
president to manage his staff on his own.  
This does not mean that a formal staff hierarchy is not without its faults. Ronald Reagan's 
effective but factious "troika" and Bill Clinton's "spokes of a wheel" highlighted the 
complexities of having multiple staffers with direct access to the president. On the other 
end of the spectrum, Ronald Reagan's second COS, Donald Regan, and George H.W. Bush's 
first COS, John Sununu, were brought down by their strong gatekeeper tendencies. By 
strictly limiting access to the president, each COS failed to control the people or the 
processes in the White House, and ultimately, their overreaching tendencies led to their 
demise as COS. While the need for a COS was evident to all, the exact formula for success 
was elusive.  
Case Study #1 - George W. Bush 
Overview 
George Walker Bush was elected as the 43rd president of the United States in 2000, after 
he defeated Democrat Al Gore in a contentious and controversial election that involved a 
recount in Florida. Eight months into Bush's first term, al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the 
United States, flying hijacked airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City. 
Bush's response was forceful, launching the War on Terror that included military action in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and created the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security 
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(Freidel and Sidney, 2009). Domestically, Bush signed into law broad tax cuts, the Patriot 
Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Medicare expansion 
for seniors, and began the presidential initiative PEPFAR, aimed at addressing the global 
health crisis of HIV\AIDS (Greenstein, 2009). During the 2004 presidential election, Bush 
won a second term by defeating John Kerry in another close election. After his re-election 
campaign, Bush faced significant criticism and low approval ratings during his second term 
for his role in beginning the war in Iraq. In December 2007 as his presidency was coming to 
a close, the United States entered a long recession, often referred to as the "Great 
Recession," that prompted the Bush administration to pass a number of economic 
programs intended to preserve the country's financial system.  
Organizational Capacity - Bush 
Many scholars predicted that Bush would organize his White House in the hierarchical 
model that he was exposed to during his father's administration (Walcott and Hult, 2003). 
However, the central inspiration for Bush's White House organization was not his father, or 
even Ford or Nixon. Instead, Bush harkened back to the "troika" model of the Reagan 
administration by installing two trusted advisors—Karen Hughes and Karl Rove—as equals 
to his COS, Andrew Card. It speaks well to Bush's organizational capacity that he launched 
his presidency with an impressively seasoned team of senior staffers. Bush's White House 
was, from the beginning, "well-disciplined, tightly organized, and extremely efficient" 
(Edwards and Wayne, 2003). As the first president with a M.B.A., Bush ran his White House 
like the CEO of an organization.  
Andrew Card as COS 
Choosing Card. Andrew Card Jr. was a close friend of the Bush family for nearly a quarter 
century and a former deputy COS in the G.H.W. Bush administration. Many scholars 
approved of the selection of Card as COS, particularly during the presidential transition, 
because of the significant White House and Washington experience that demanded the 
respect of many Beltway insiders (Ferguson, 2001; Cohen, 2002).  
Office of COS under Card. Card was, arguably, the most prepared COS in modern history, 
having worked for seven previous White House chiefs of staff. He was organized and 
efficient, and he knew the interworkings of the White House. In a Bush White House, 
tempered by intimate political insiders such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, Card 
was even-keeled and steady-tempered in a way that balanced the egos of the staffers and 
provided balance for the president. Card was a constant presence in the Bush White House, 
in the room during nearly all significant policy discussion, including those relating to 
national security and foreign policy post 9-11 (McClellan, 2008). Card is widely viewed as 
providing much-needed experience, knowledge, and organizational skill to the G.W. Bush 
administration to produce a White House free of the organizational blunders so prevalent 
at the beginning of most early administrations (Cohen, 2002). The two main roles of COS 
that Card embodied were that of administrator and guardian. In an interview with the 
Christian Science Monitor, Card explained, "There is only one power center—and it's in the 
Oval Office" (Kieferand and McLaughlin, 2001). Card was truly an extension of his boss. 
While his role of guardian was slightly complicated by the presence of other senior staffers 
who had access to the Oval Office (Karl Rove, Karen Hughes, Dick Cheney, etc.), Card 
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viewed his most important role as managing the president's time wisely. According to one 
journalist, Card fulfilled his role as administrator and guardian with a "unique mix of 
politeness and well-timed bluntness" that “lubricated the Bush operation with big doses of 
courtesy and candor, high expectations, and humility" (Kieferand and McLaughlin, 2001).  
Summary and Departure. In March 2006, Bush was beginning to hear complaints about 
White House dysfunction. Over lunch in early 2006, a close confidant pulled out a pen and a 
napkin and sketched the organizational system of the White House. Bush writes in his 
memoir (2010), "It was a tangled mess, with lines of authority crossing and blurred...He 
told me that several people had spontaneously used the same unflattering term: It started 
with 'cluster' and ended with four more letters." After this conversation, Bush believed it 
was time for a change in COS. On April 14, 2006, Andrew Card stepped down as White 
House COS, having served in the position for almost five years and three months, the 
longest any COS has served to date.  
Joshua Bolten as COS  
Choosing Bolten. As a replacement to Andrew Card, Bush chose his Office of Management 
and Budget director, Joshua Bolten. Previously, Bolten served as the deputy COS for policy 
under departing COS Andy Card from 2001 to 2003.  
Office of COS under Bolten. Immediately after Bolten's appointment as COS, he began to 
construct a stronger staff hierarchy. Card's organizational structure drew criticism after 
Karl Rove was reported to be playing a large advisor role in the president's foreign policy 
decisions, including forming and chairing the internal White House working group, the 
White House Iraq Group (WHIG). WHIG's main responsibility was to develop a strategy "for 
publicizing the White House's assertion that Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United 
States." This working group was little known until early 2004, and when made public, drew 
intense criticism for Rove's handling of potentially classified information about the Iraq 
War (Arena, 2004). He solidified Karl Rove's position and provided boundaries by 
appointing him as deputy COS for policy, placing Rove directly under Bolten's command in 
staff hierarchy. Similar to Card, Bolten placed the most focus on his role of administrator, 
but unlike Card, he placed slightly more emphasis on his role as advisor, particularly as it 
related to national security and the burgeoning Iraq War. As administrator, Bolten 
restructured White House staff and advised President Bush on cabinet departures. In the 
midst of the Iraq War, Bolten believed that Bush was not being provided with enough 
diversity in opinion and undertook his role as advisor to share his viewpoint with 
President Bush himself. He explains: "I took it as one of my roles as chief of staff to say, 'I 
am the new guy here—but this looks very bad to me. I told the president I thought his 
apparatus was not serving him as well as it should, because he wasn't being given 
alternatives... I viewed it as my job as chief of staff to be the one to say, "Why aren't you 
giving the president better options?"  
Summary and Departure. Bolten served until the end of the Bush administration in 2009. 
His tenure in the White House brought much-needed organization that had begun to wane 
under Andy Card. Further, Bolten was effective in countering some of Bush's personal 
weaknesses by providing a structured open-door policy that helped to counter the 
weakness inherent to Bush's closed-door, CEO-style organization that tended to alienate 
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members of Congress and White House staffers.  
Case Study #2 - Barack Obama  
Overview 
Barack Obama served as the 44th president of the United States from 2009 until 2017. 
During his first two years in office, Obama signed a number of landmark legislations into 
law, including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform, and the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Obama inherited nationwide economic 
woes from his predecessor and passed a number of laws specifically related to economic 
stimulus, including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Unemployment 
Insurance Reauthorization, and the Job Creation Act of 2010. In foreign policy, Obama 
worked to end military involvement in the Iraq War and ordered the military operation 
that ended in the death of terrorist Osama bin Laden, which brokered a nuclear deal with 
Iran and normalized relations with Cuba.  
Organizational Capacity - Obama  
At the outset of the Obama administration in 2008, some scholars were concerned about 
the organizational capacity of the White House, particularly President Obama's lack of 
experience in presiding over large organizations (Greenstein, 2011). Initial decisions about 
White House staffing, most notably the inclusion of a number of personal confidants as 
senior advisors in the White House, seem to reflect President Obama's desire to maintain a 
hierarchy while also ensuring that he was the final decision maker and his decisions were 
influenced by a wide range of opinions (Cohen, Hult, and Walcott, 2012). In a model self-
described as a "collaborative hierarchy," President Obama maintained his final decision-
making power while operating multiple specialized policy lines that allowed a variety of 
opinions to reach the Oval Office (Rudalevige, 2012). 
Rahm Emanuel as COS  
Choosing Emanuel. Emanuel was reportedly not Obama's first choice for COS. In October 
2008, Obama reportedly asked former Clinton chiefs of staff Leon Panetta and Erskine 
Bowles, as well as his Senate COS Pete Rouse, if they would consider the position, and each 
declined. Eventually, the conversation turned to Rahm Emanuel. Obama and Emanuel were 
not close friends, but he did have Washington experience (particularly on the Hill) and a 
willingness to tell the president what he did not want to hear.  
Office of COS under Emanuel. The challenges at the beginning of the Obama administration 
were profound, but so were the opportunities. In spite of the Iraq War and the financial 
crisis of 2008, Obama had big majorities in the House and the Senate that made many 
staffers optimistic about legislative success. Emanuel recognized this potential and set a 
laser-like focus on success. Emanuel was brash and profane with his subordinates in 
pursuit of his true passion—progressive public policy. In many ways, Emanuel was the ying 
to Obama's yang. He was the temperamental to Obama's calm, and the crude to Obama's 
professional. Emanuel maintained a high level of control over substantive policy processes 
that flowed through the Oval Office, but at the same time, multiple senior level advisors had 
independent access to President Obama (Cohen, Hult, and Walcott, 2012). The tension 
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between Emanuel and Obama's other closest advisors was palpable. In an interview, 
Emanuel described his relationship with Obama advisor Valerie Jarrett: "It's tough to have 
her around when you're trying to tell the president, 'Well no, I think this is wrong.' Because 
she's always there saying, 'Oh, yes, it's fine'" (Whipple, 2017). Arguably, the role that 
Emanuel devoted most of his time to was the role of proxy. In virtually all the major 
legislative battles that took place under Emanuel's tenure, he took the lead on negotiating 
and moving the legislature through Congress. As COS, he uniquely had a single-minded 
focus on the Hill. He began every day in the congressional gym, had lunches each day in his 
office with Congressmen, and even operated on a congressional calendar (Whipple, 2017). 
A 2009 Washington Post article noted: “The White House legislative strategy blends 
Obama’s vision and salesmanship with Emanuel’s granular political expertise and deal 
making skills" (Murray, 2009). Emanuel was highly accessible to the news media and 
willing to speak on the record on almost every issue of importance (Milbank, 2009). During 
his tenure, he was a regular on the Sunday news circuit and was generally viewed as 
speaking for the administration.  
Summary and Departure. On September 7, 2010, Richard M. Daley, the mayor of Chicago, 
announced he would not run for re-election. It was a once-in-a-lifetime chance for Emanuel, 
and he leapt at the opportunity. On October 1, 2010, Rahm Emanuel resigned to enter the 
mayoral race in Chicago, Illinois. In two years as COS, Emanuel had achieved major success: 
passing a major economic stimulus, saving the auto industry, and beginning to put 
healthcare reform on track to become law. His success as a presidential proxy, particularly 
in the halls of Congress, is unrivaled by any other COS in modern history. However, during 
his tenure, Emanuel drew sharp criticism for his failure to be an honest broker with the 
president, acting instead as an advocate for his own personal policy preferences. 
Ultimately, despite Emanuel's successes, his brash personality was not a good fit in the 
Obama White House. When Emanuel made clear to President Obama that he was serious 
about leaving, Obama did not offer much resistance.  
William Daley as COS  
Choosing Daley. To replace Emanuel, President Obama turned to another Chicagoan, 
William (Bill) Daley. Daley had been President Clinton's Secretary of Commerce, Al Gore's 
2000 presidential campaign manager, and a JPMorgan Chase executive. Daley's hiring had a 
twofold purpose: first, build a bridge between the White House and the business world; 
second, install more discipline in the White House organizational process.  
Office of COS under Daley. Daley's tenure was marked by a string of crises—the Gabby 
Giffords tragedy, a Japanese tsunami, and the Arab Spring. It was not long before it was 
clear to many that Daley was a bad fit for the Obama administration. While Daley 
attempted to maintain the rough organizational structure of his predecessor, he also 
installed more hierarchical processes in the White House and attempted to control access 
to the president more tightly. He canceled the traditional 8:30 a.m. staff meeting, leaving 
many staffers out of the loop, and barred key aides from other important meetings. Scholar 
David Cohen (2012) writes, "Daley’s brisk, officious, corporate closed-door style has soured 
some White House staffers who think he’s pinching Obama’s access to his own people, 
depriving him of a wider variety of opinions at a time when coming up with creative 
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solutions to the country’s economic malaise—and the president’s political slump—are at a 
premium.” Further, the president and Daley never truly clicked. Obama preferred advisors 
who could talk nitty-gritty details of policy, while Daley much preferred to talk politics or 
Chicago sports. After just a few months as COS, it was clear that Daley's authority was 
ebbing. Clinton COS Erskine Bowles said about Daley: "The key to success as chief of staff is 
being empowered by the president. When people saw that Bill Daley wasn't empowered, he 
was dead. You have zero power then, and you might as well just pick yourself up and go 
home" (Whipple, 2017). 
Summary and Departure. On October 28, 2011, Politico published an exclusive interview 
with Daley, in which he described his role in the White House as "ungodly" and "brutal" and 
repeatedly berated key figures in the Obama administration, including his predecessor, 
Rahm Emanuel and Democratic majority leader Senator Harry Reid. Eleven days after the 
interview, Daley was demoted within White House organization, effectively serving as COS 
in name only. Managerial responsibilities were taken over by Pete Rouse, senior advisor to 
the president. In January 2012, Daley went to the president with his resignation, and the 
president accepted. Daley's tenure as COS brought much-needed organization to the White 
House, but he was never able to fully grasp the complexities of his role, which provided 
many challenges to the Obama administration overall.  
Jack Lew as COS  
Choosing Lew. After Daley's departure, Jack Lew was tapped to run the White House. Lew, 
the then-director of the Office of Management and Budget, was also a former senior policy 
advisor to Speaker of the House, Tipp O'Neill. AS OMB director, Lew and Obama had a close 
working relationship through their work on the stimulus package, the grand bargain, and 
the debt ceiling. At the time of his appointment, there were few people as compatible with 
the president as Lew.  
Office of COS under Lew. Lew restored calm to a White House marked by the tumultuous 
reign of William Daley. Lew's main duties as COS revolved around the 2012 federal budget 
deal. In this capacity, Lew served mainly as an advisor and proxy. Lew was well-known 
inside the Beltway as a level-headed, data-driven bargainer, which was a valuable asset to 
the Obama administration during the contentious budget process. As proxy to the Hill, Lew 
always ensured that he was speaking for the president, not for himself.  
Summary and Departure. Lew was brought on as COS in light of the impending budget deal, 
and he delivered on the result. While Obama hoped that Lew would stay on as COS, Lew 
was determined to become Secretary of the Treasury. If he could not get that job, he told 
Obama, he would return to New York and enter the business world (Whipple, 2017). On 
January 20, 2013, nearly a year to the day that he accepted the position, Lew resigned as 
COS. Shortly after, he was appointed by President Obama as Secretary of the Treasury, a 
role in which he served until the end of the Obama administration.  
Denis McDonough as COS  
Choosing McDonough. For his fourth COS of his administration, President Obama selected 
Denis McDonough, his deputy national security advisor and close personal friend. This 
selection reflects Obama's desire to work with people he knows and trusts, as well as a 
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stronger emphasis on foreign policy during his second term. Tom Daschle, friend of both 
Obama and McDonough, believed the two were a perfect fit: "I think Denis's style and 
approach is exactly what the president needed and wanted. Denis's style is really the 
president's style. They give each other strength. President Obama really benefited from 
Denis's common sense and judgement and ability to manage all the egos that exist in any 
administration" (Whipple, 2017).  
Office of COS under McDonough. McDonough's tenure was marked with a number of 
scandals, including Benghazi and the IRS' targeting of conservative groups. McDonough 
balanced all four of the major roles of COS during his tenure but placed particular emphasis 
on his role of administrator and guardian. McDonough and Obama's relationship meant 
that McDonough was fiercely protective of Obama, which influenced his administrative 
capacity. Described by one journalist as a "guard dog with people skills," McDonough 
placed strong emphasis on protecting the president, but did so in a manner that did not 
make people feel excluded from the administration as a whole. McDonough's oft-repeated 
slogan, "One team, one fight" highlighted his administrative capacity as COS—all staff were 
working toward one "fight", namely, advancing the Obama administration's policies. There 
was no room for personal agendas under McDonough's command.    
Summary and Departure. McDonough served until the end of the Obama administration on 
January 20, 2017. McDonough's tenure highlighted the importance of a close relationship 
between a COS and his president.  
Discussion and Conclusion   
 The formalistic model of White House organization has proven itself to be robust 
over the course of the modern presidency, including at least two (Bush and Obama) in 
which they initially sought to modify the formal staff hierarchy. Both presidents took office 
and attempted to surround themselves with multiple advisors who had access to the Oval 
Office. In the Bush administration, Karl Rove and Karen Hughes accessed the president 
outside of the formal staff hierarchy that Andrew Card toiled to implement. When 
organizational lines began to wane, Joshua Bolten, Bush's second and final COS, placed 
Rove within the formal staff hierarchy and oversaw White House staff during a second term 
marked by the Iraq War and the financial crisis of 2008. As a whole, Bush's chiefs of staff 
placed the most emphasis on their roles of administrator and guardian during their 
tenures. In contrast, the Obama chiefs of staff, in varying degrees, placed a strong emphasis 
on their roles of advisor and proxy. Chiefs Emanuel and Lew garnered significant legislative 
successes during their tenures, including the auto industry bailout, healthcare legislation, 
and multiple budget negotiations. COS McDonough was also a valued advisor to President 
Obama during his tenure, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, an area of renewed 
emphasis toward the end of his administration. The Obama COS who placed the most 
emphasis on his role as administrator, Bill Daley, was largely ineffective in his role. As an 
administrator, he alienated staffers with his corporate closed-door style and was never 
fully integrated to the Obama administration's goals. While President Obama actively 
attempted to maintain a more open organizational system, by the end of his administration, 
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his last COS, Denis McDonough, maintained a much more formalistic model of organization 
by placing himself as the leader of Obama's "team."  
Chiefs of staff who are effective in their major duties have a positive impact on the 
administration. This is not to say that each COS places an identical emphasis on each of 
their major roles. Different chiefs adapt their behavior to fit the needs of the president they 
serve and the major organizational needs of their White House. White House staff and 
organization should strive to complement the president's strengths and minimize his 
weaknesses. Regardless of personal style or preference, the White House needs a COS to 
impose order, advise on policy development, serve as a gatekeeper to the president, and 
settle staffing disputes that are not of particular presidential importance. Organizational 
styles that are too open in access to the president prevent the chief of staff from performing 
these roles effectively, forcing the president to be a mediator in issues that are not of 
presidential importance. Someone short of the president must be in charge, or the 
president will be overwhelmed. Therefore, the formalistic model of White House 
organization serves both the COS and the president by providing clear, delineated lines of 
organization that clarify the specific roles that each individual fills.  
White House organization faces its next challenge under President Donald Trump. When 
the former real estate mogul announced his candidacy for president, many believed that he 
would run the White House like his own business. However, there are many ways in which 
a business is very different than the White House, and a near-constant revolving door of 
senior-level staffers suggests that the White House organization of the Trump 
administration is not nearly as effective as it could be. The particular style of organization 
that Trump is mimicking harkens back to the competitive model, used during the Roosevelt 
administration. President Trump has surrounded himself with individuals from a variety of 
Republican factions as senior level staffers. During the 2016 presidential elections, Trump 
often decried mainstream Republicans in favor of other factions of the Republican Party, 
including the business world and populist or nationalist groups. When staffing his White 
House, Trump seemed to intentionally select individuals from varying groups within the 
Republican Party and the right-wing populist movement. For example, the first months of 
his administration saw Reince Priebus, former Republican National Committee chairman, 
appointed as COS and Steve Bannon, executive chair of Breitbart News, a publication with 
strong economic nationalist leanings, appointed as chief strategist. Priebus and Bannon 
were bonded, politically or otherwise, by little except their boss. They had fundamentally 
different ideas about what the Trump administration should look like. The chaos inherent 
in this design is what the competitive model thrives on. It deliberately seeks to provoke 
conflict among different factions to provide the best possible answer to problems. 
However, the main weakness of the competitive model is that it requires the president to 
broker the diversity of opinions personally. Thus far in the administration, there seems to 
be a lack of interest in personally brokering the conflicts inherent in this type of 
organizational system. Without an honest broker, the system dissolves into chaos.  
To make a change that is desperately needed in the current administration, however, 
organizational lines must be clarified. Throughout recent presidencies, we see that the 
longer a staff serves, the more organization moves toward a formalistic model of White 
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House organization. Current COS John Kelly seems to be desperately attempting to steer 
the Trump administration in this direction, but he cannot make this change by himself. The 
delegation of power to the hands of the COS inherently requires the tacit approval of the 
president himself, something that seems unlikely, given current reports about a strained 
relationship between President Trump and Chief Kelly. Another complication to White 
House organization is the family members that serve in the Trump administration, notably 
Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump. White House organization will be inherently collegial 
with the presence of family members who always have access to the president, regardless 
of formal organizational models.    
Ultimately, no White House organization or COS will be a savior for a presidency that is 
inclined to chaos and destruction. Presidential scholar Bert Rockman explains: ""No system 
or organization ultimately can save a President from himself when he is inclined to self-
destruct. And no system that a President is uncomfortable with will last" (Rockman, 1988). 
If presidents are not intentional in the means with which they organize their White House, 
their presidencies will be vulnerable to turmoil and their own agendas may be 
compromised.  
 
FIGURE 1: Models of White House Organization 
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FIGURE 2: Chiefs of Staff: Nixon-Trump, 1969-2018 
  
Chief of Staff  Tenure President Party 
H.R. Haldeman 1969 - 73 Nixon Republican 
Alexander M. Haig Jr.  1973 - 74 Nixon Republican 
Donald M. Rumsfeld 1974 - 75 Ford Republican 
Richard M. Cheney 1975 - 77 Ford Republican 
Hamilton H.M. Jordan 1979 - 80 Carter Democrat 
Jack H. Watson 1980 - 81 Carter Democrat 
James A. Baker III 1981 - 85 Reagan Republican  
Donald T. Regan 1985 - 87 Reagan  Republican  
Howard H. Baker Jr.  1987 - 88 Reagan  Republican  
Kenneth M. Duberstein 1988 - 89 Reagan  Republican  
John H. Sununu 1989 - 91 Bush Republican  
Samuel K. Skinner 1991 - 92 Bush Republican  
James A. Baker III 1992 - 93 Bush Republican  
Thomas F. McLarty III 1993 - 94 Clinton Democrat 
Leon Panetta 1994 - 96 Clinton Democrat 
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Erskine B. Bowles 1997 - 98 Clinton Democrat 
John D. Podesta 1998 - 2000 Clinton Democrat 
Andrew H. Card Jr.  2001 - 06 Bush Republican  
Joshua B. Bolton 2006 - 09 Bush  Republican  
Rahm I. Emanuel  2009 - 10 Obama Democrat 
William M. Daley 2011 - 12 Obama Democrat 
Jack Lew 2012 - 13 Obama Democrat 
Denis McDonough 2013 - 17 Obama Democrat 
Reince Priebus 2017 Trump Republican  
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